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To determine whether frontline health care workers 
(HCWs) are at greater risk for contracting pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 than nonclinical staff, we conducted a study of 231 
HCWs and 215 controls. Overall, 79 (17.7%) of 446 had a 
positive antibody titer by hemagglutination inhibition, with 
46 (19.9%) of 231 HCWs and 33 (15.3%) of 215 controls 
positive (OR 1.37, 95% conﬁ  dence interval 0.84–2.22). Of 
87 participants who provided a second serum sample, 1 
showed a 4-fold rise in antibody titer; of 45 patients who 
had a nose swab sample taken during a respiratory illness, 
7 had positive results. Higher numbers of children in a 
participant’s family and working in an intensive care unit 
were risk factors for infection; increasing age, working at 
hospital 2, and wearing gloves were protective factors. This 
highly exposed group of frontline HCWs was no more likely 
to contract pandemic (H1N1) 2009 inﬂ  uenza infection than 
nonclinical staff, which suggests that personal protective 
measures were adequate in preventing transmission.
A
ustralia was affected early in the (H1N1) 2009 inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic with 37,636 cases and 191 deaths reported. 
The state of Victoria was the ﬁ  rst to observe a substantial 
peak in the number of persons infected (1). The pandemic 
was managed within the framework of the Australian 
Health Management Plan for Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza  (2). 
Guidelines for use of personal protective equipment (PPE) 
were established in the Victorian Health Management Plan 
for Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza (3). Recommendations included 
use of N95 masks, gloves, protective eyewear, and long-
sleeved gowns.
Inﬂ  uenza in health care workers (HCWs) is common, 
and acquisition in the workplace is well documented. An 
uncontrolled study found that after an inﬂ  uenza epidemic 
in Glasgow, Scotland, 120 (23.2%) of 518 HCWs 
seroconverted (4). Early in 2009, twelve HCWs with 
probable or possible work place acquisition of pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza were reported in the United States. None had 
worn full PPE (5).
That HCWs may be concerned about attending work 
during a potentially serious inﬂ   uenza pandemic is not 
surprising. During the severe acute respiratory syndrome 
outbreak of 2003, some HCWs reportedly stayed at home 
for fear of becoming infected and transmitting infection 
to family members. A number of surveys have found that 
16%–33% of HCWs may not report to work in the event of 
an inﬂ  uenza pandemic (6–9).
HCWs need to know the transmission risks to make 
rational decisions about working during an inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic. Because HCWs are exposed in the community as 
well as the workplace, they should know about the additional 
risks for contracting inﬂ  uenza at work. This information is 
also imperative for pandemic workforce planning.
We sought to determine whether frontline HCWs 
were at greater risk for contracting pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 inﬂ  uenza than the control group. Additionally, we 
sought information on factors that may have increased or 
decreased the risk for infection.
Methods
We conducted a cohort study, comparing frontline 
HCWs with intensive patient contact (clinical) and staff 
with no patient contact (nonclinical). Frontline HCWs 
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were deﬁ  ned as those who worked >1 shift per week and 
had likely exposure to patients with pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
infection. These workers included doctors, nurses, and 
physiotherapists, as well as others in the emergency 
department, intensive care unit, infectious diseases 
units, and respiratory and other wards where patients 
with suspected pandemic inﬂ  uenza were housed. Staff 
members who had no clinical contact were chosen as a 
convenient surrogate for a community control group. 
These workers included university and hospital staff in 
nonpatient contact areas such as the library, information 
technology, and administration. This study was approved 
by the Human Research Ethics Committees at each of 
the hospitals and all participants gave written informed 
consent. The study was conducted from August 24, 2009, 
through December 16, 2009.
Four tertiary referral hospitals in metropolitan 
Melbourne were involved: Royal Melbourne, St Vincent’s, 
Austin, and Alfred Hospitals. At all sites, patients with 
suspected or conﬁ  rmed pandemic inﬂ  uenza infection were 
cared for in negative pressure isolation rooms when they 
were available, and in private rooms when they were not. 
Institutional infection control policies directed that gloves, 
gowns, goggles, and masks be used when caring for these 
patients. Use of N95 masks was initially recommended in 
all hospitals, although hospital 1 changed to surgical masks 
after June 16, 2009. Hand hygiene with an alcohol-based 
product and respiratory etiquette were promoted at all 
hospitals.
The progression of the pandemic in Victoria is shown 
in Figure 1. The original research plan was to obtain 2 
serum samples, 3 months apart, from all participants to test 
for seroconversion and also to obtain weekly nose swabs for 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza detection by using real-time PCR. By 
the time the study commenced, the pandemic was waning, 
inﬂ  uenza cases were decreasing in Victoria, and following 
the original study plan was not considered feasible.
The plan was thus modiﬁ   ed. An initial serum 
sample was obtained from all participants to measure for 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza antibodies. At study entry, participants 
completed a Web- or paper-based questionnaire that 
requested information on demographic characteristics, 
known inﬂ  uenza exposures outside the workplace, and any 
history of fever or respiratory symptoms occurring during 
the pandemic but before the study. In addition, the clinical 
group was asked about work exposure to patients with 
suspected pandemic inﬂ  uenza and their usual use of PPE 
when caring for these patients. Participants were also asked 
about use of neuraminidase inhibitors (NIs) and speciﬁ  cally 
whether they received prophylaxis after exposure to a 
patient with conﬁ  rmed inﬂ  uenza.
Participants were instructed to provide nose swab 
specimens for viral testing if they experienced signs and 
symptoms, including cough, sore throat, rhinorrhea, 
laryngitis, fever, myalgias, or headache. All were asked 
to complete a weekly questionnaire regarding symptoms, 
inﬂ  uenza exposure, and use of NIs. If a participant reported 
respiratory illness, a second serum sample was requested 
for antibody testing to document possible seroconversion.
Serum was tested for antibodies to pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 inﬂ   uenza virus by using the hemagglutination 
inhibition assay with A/California/7/2009 virus and turkey 
red blood cells (10). A titer of <40 was deﬁ  ned as negative 
and >40 as positive. Nucleic acid detection was performed 
on nasal swabs by using reverse transcription PCR (RT-
PCR) for inﬂ  uenza-speciﬁ  c and pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus–speciﬁ  c sequences on swabs; kits were provided by 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta, 
GA, USA) (11) and an ABI-7500FAST instrument at the 
World Health Organization (WHO) Collaborating Centre 
for Reference and Research on Inﬂ  uenza in Melbourne.
Statistical Analysis
On the basis of early estimates of antibody positivity 
to pandemic inﬂ  uenza virus in the community, we assumed 
20% infection rates in clinical staff and 10% rates in 
nonclinical staff. We calculated that 438 participants were 
required to achieve 80% power to detect this difference 
using a 0.05 two-tailed signiﬁ   cance level. The primary 
outcome was the presence of a positive antibody titer in the 
ﬁ  rst serum sample, indicating likely pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
infection.
We performed 2 separate univariate and multivariate 
analyses to delineate putative risk and protective factors 
(1 included all participants and the other included clinical 
participants only) to investigate any association between 
health care–speciﬁ  c risk factors and pandemic inﬂ  uenza. 
Multivariate analysis was performed by using forward 
and backward stepwise logistic regression, including all 
variables in the model initially and a p value for removal 
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Figure 1. Notiﬁ  ed cases of laboratory conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 
2009, by week, Victoria, Australia, 2009. Arrows indicate dates 
when this study and vaccination commenced. Data provided by 
Victorian Department of Health, 2010.RESEARCH
of 0.1 and for entry of 0.2. Data were analyzed by using 
StataIC10 (StataCorp., College Station, TX, USA).
Results
The study took place from August 24, 2009, through 
December 16, 2009, largely before release of the pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza vaccine, and no participant was vaccinated during 
the study. Table 1 shows the number of patients who had 
conﬁ  rmed pandemic inﬂ  uenza infection (by PCR) and were 
treated in each of the hospitals. Characteristics of study 
participants are shown in Table 2.
A total of 446 HCWs participated in the study, 231 
in the clinical group and 215 in the nonclinical group. 
Overall, 79 (17.7%) of 446 demonstrated evidence of 
infection on the basis of a positive antibody titer of >40, 
46 (19.9%) of 231 in the clinical group, and 33 (15.3%) 
of 215 in the nonclinical group; the difference was not 
statistically signiﬁ  cant (odds ratio [OR] = 1.37, p = 0.21, 
95% conﬁ  dence interval [CI] 0.84–2.22).
The median participant age was 38 years (range 18–
74 years); 27% were <30 years of age, 20% were 30–39 
years of age, 25% were 40–49 years of age, and 20% were 
>50 years of age. Figure 2 shows the reverse cumulative 
distribution of ﬁ  rst serum antibody titers, according to age. 
We found no statistically signiﬁ  cant difference between the 
curves (p = 0.11 by ordinal logistic regression).
On multivariate logistic regression, the only factor 
associated with a higher risk for pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
among all participants was younger age (OR 0.96, 95% 
CI 0.94–0.99) after adjustment for participant status 
(clinical vs. nonclinical), age, gender, hospital, seasonal 
inﬂ   uenza vaccination, conﬁ   rmed pandemic inﬂ  uenza, 
reported respiratory illness, community contact with 
inﬂ   uenza, oseltamivir prophylaxis, number of children 
in the household <18 years of age, and hours worked per 
week. On univariate analysis, the only factors that were 
signiﬁ  cantly associated with protection against infection in 
the clinical group were use of any mask (OR 0.16, 95% CI 
0.03–0.97) and use of gloves (OR 0.09, 95% CI 0.02–0.5) 
for patients in droplet precautions. Adjusted odds ratios are 
shown in Table 3.
Serology and Swab Test Results
Of the 395 participants, 140 (35%) reported a 
respiratory illness and 46 had nose swabs taken. Seven 
were positive for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus by PCR, 
1 for subtype H3N2 inﬂ  uenza, and 38 were negative. One 
of the 46 had 2 swabs taken during different illnesses; the 
ﬁ  rst was positive and the second was negative for pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus. PCR cycle threshold values for swab 
specimens were from 30 to 40, indicating low viral loads. 
This ﬁ  nding may indicate that poor swabbing techniques 
were used, that the sample had been taken as infection was 
waning, or that level of infection was low (data not shown).
For 87 participants, a second serum sample was taken 
because of a reported respiratory illness. The average 
number of days between the ﬁ  rst and second sample was 
60 days (range 28 to 122 days, median 54) days. Thirty-
six participants who had nose swabs performed also had 
a second serum sample taken. Seroconversion occurred 
in only 1/87 workers, with an initial titer of <10 and a 
subsequent titer of 40 (76 days later). This participant had 
a nose swab taken during a respiratory infection, which 
was negative for inﬂ  uenza virus. Seroconversion did not 
occur in any of the participants with a positive nose swab 
specimen. The mean number of days from obtaining a 
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Table 2. Characteristics of clinical and nonclinical participants at 4 hospitals at study entry (unless otherwise specified) who were 
infected with pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Australia, August 24–December 16, 2009* 
Factor  Clinical participants, n = 231 Nonclinical participants, n = 215
Antibody titer >40 46 (19.9) 33  (15.3)
Mean age, y (range)  35.1 (19.8–56.6)  43.2 (18.5–74.1) 
Female gender  157 (68.0)  153 (71.2) 
Seasonal vaccination 2009  163 (70.1)  141 (65.6) 
Previous seasonal vaccination  187 (80.0)  152 (70.7) 
Reported confirmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus infection  1 (0.4)  0
Other influenza-like illness  155 (67.1)  118 (54.9) 
Oseltamivir prophylaxis  13 (5.6)  1 (0.5) 
Community contact with influenza  42 (18.2)  46 (21.4) 
Median no. children <18 years in household (range)  0 (0–7)  0 (0–3) 
Nasal swab taken during study  30 (12.9)  16 (7.4) 
Mean no. hours worked per week (range)  39.2 (8–90)  37.9 (6–86) 
*Values are no. (%) except as indicated. 
Table 1. Number of patients with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
influenza virus infection at each of 4 hospitals, Australia, August 
24–December 16, 2009* 
Hospital
no.
No. patients with 
confirmed pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 
No.
inpatients
No. ICU 
patients
No.
deaths
15 7 3 6 1 0 0
28 5 3 5 8 3
39 7 4 3 9 2
43 3 2 7 1 0 3
*ICU, intensive care unit. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Risk for Health Care Workers
positive nose swab specimen to the second serum sample 
was 44 days (actual number: 14, 21, 27, 43, 45, 114 days). 
One participant with a positive nose swab sample did not 
have a second serum sample taken. None of the participants 
with a positive nose swab or seroconversion reported taking 
NIs in their weekly survey.
Four of the 7 participants with a positive PCR result and 
the 1 in whom seroconversion occurred were in the clinical 
group (3 doctors, 1 pharmacist, 1 nurse, 1 physiotherapist). 
The participant who showed seroconversion was 29 years 
of age; participants with a positive PCR result ranged from 
24–63 years of age. Two of the participants with a positive 
PCR result worked on the infectious disease ward, 2 in the 
emergency department, and 1 in the intensive care unit; 
seroconversion occurred in the participant who worked 
in a medical ward. Five of the participants with positive 
PCR results and the participant in whom seroconversion 
occurred had received the 2009 and previous seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza vaccines. None of the participants with conﬁ  rmed 
inﬂ  uenza reported taking oseltamivir for either prophylaxis 
or treatment.
Weekly Questionnaires
In total, 395 participants completed 1–13 weekly 
questionnaires each. Eighty-nine clinical and 51 nonclinical 
participants reported 139 and 91 respiratory illnesses, 
respectively. No participant reported having laboratory-
conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 inﬂ  uenza. Six reported 
community contact with someone who had laboratory-
conﬁ  rmed infection. One reported taking oseltamivir after 
contact with an infected person in the workplace. This 
person had 2 serum samples taken 88 days apart; both had 
an antibody titer of <10.
Discussion
In this study, we evaluated the risk for pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 in HCWs compared with the risk for such infection 
in a control group, as well as the factors associated with 
infection. HCWs had slightly higher rates of seropositivity 
than nonclinical staff; however, this difference was not 
statistically signiﬁ  cant. Our data are supported by results 
of another recent study, which found that being a HCW 
was not a risk factor for serologically conﬁ  rmed seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza virus infection and that the risk of HCWs acquiring 
inﬂ  uenza was more strongly associated with household than 
workplace exposure (12). That study found a seroconversion 
rate of 11.2% in HCWs and 10.3% in non-HCWs. However, 
it examined only doctors and nurses, whereas our study 
included other types of frontline HCWs. Another study 
reported a seroprevalence for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 of 
26.7% in HCWs, which was not signiﬁ  cantly different from 
the seroprevalence of the general population (13). Neither 
of these studies examined use of PPE.
Overall, we found that 17.7% of participants had 
serologic evidence of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection 
after the peak of the outbreak. This proportion reﬂ  ects the 
observed 16% seroprevalence in adults in Melbourne (14). 
These rates are lower, however, than the 31.7% antibody 
positivity found in South Australia during a prelicensure 
study of pandemic inﬂ  uenza vaccine in July 2009, which 
excluded subjects with conﬁ  rmed or suspected pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 inﬂ  uenza (15). This difference in titers may 
have reﬂ  ected geographic differences in infection rates or 
differences between the populations sampled.
In the analysis of all participants, we found that older 
age was associated with lower rates of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 inﬂ  uenza infection. We did not observe higher levels 
of preexisting antibodies against pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
inﬂ  uenza with increasing age, which has previously been 
reported. However, results of other studies examining the 
relationship between seroprevalence and increasing age are 
conﬂ  icting (15–18). Immune mechanisms other than type-
speciﬁ  c antibodies may be providing protection for older 
participants. Other possibilities are that older persons have 
older children who may be less likely to acquire or transmit 
inﬂ  uenza or that older participants were more conscientious 
with respiratory etiquette and hand hygiene; attempts to 
measure these factors were not included in this study.
Among the HCWs we studied, working at hospital 2 
conferred protection against pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus 
infection. This hospital was in a geographic area with fewer 
cases than the others, but if this were the explanation, then a 
similar ﬁ  nding might have been expected in the nonclinical 
group, which was not demonstrated. Furthermore, at 
least as many cases of conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
inﬂ  uenza were seen at hospital 2 as were seen at the other 
hospitals (Table 1). Factors such as reported compliance 
with PPE, were adjusted for in the multivariable analysis 
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Figure 2. Reverse cumulative distribution of ﬁ  rst serum antibody 
titer for pandemic (H1N1) 2009, by patient age, Victoria, Australia, 
2009.RESEARCH
to reduce the effect of hospital type on inﬂ  uenza risk. The 
reason for the lower risk associated with hospital 2 has not 
been identiﬁ  ed but may relate to other unmeasured factors, 
such as compliance with hand hygiene procedures.
Wearing gloves while caring for patients as part of 
droplet precautions was strongly associated with a lower 
risk of having had pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection. 
Use of gloves was highly correlated with use of gowns, 
masks, and eye protection on logistic regression (results 
not shown). This ﬁ  nding conﬁ  rms the great importance of 
PPE in preventing transmission of respiratory viruses in 
the health care setting and may explain why HCWs with 
deﬁ  nite exposure to inﬂ  uenza in the workplace, in addition 
to probable exposure in the community, do not have higher 
rates of infection than those with only community exposure.
The risk for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection 
increased with the number of children <18 years of age 
living in the participant’s household, which has previously 
been reported as a risk factor (12). In Victoria, the median 
age of persons with reported pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus 
infection was 15 years, with 67% of all notiﬁ  ed  case-
patients being 5–17 years of age (1). Miller et al. also 
found that children were predominantly infected (17). 
This ﬁ  nding, coupled with the difﬁ  culties of maintaining 
good respiratory etiquette in young children, is a plausible 
explanation for the effect of child number on infection risk.
Working in the ICU was also identiﬁ  ed as a risk factor 
for pandemic inﬂ  uenza; patients in ICU may be severely 
ill, with high viral loads, and staff may be heavily exposed 
during multiple aerosol-generating procedures. In addition, 
use of PPE and hand hygiene compliance may have been 
lower than in other wards or patients with pandemic 
inﬂ   uenza may have been unrecognized and therefore 
appropriate PPE not used.
Exposure of HCWs to suspected or proven pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza in the community was protective against having a 
positive antibody test result. This ﬁ  nding is counterintuitive 
and difﬁ  cult to explain. One hypothesis is that HCWs who 
knew that they had had community exposure may have 
been more attentive to hand hygiene and other infection 
control precautions while at work or were more likely to 
enact social distancing.
We found only 1 instance of seroconversion among 
the 87 participants (including the 6 with PCR-conﬁ  rmed 
infection), each of whom had 2 serum samples taken for 
antibody measurement. Miller et al. reported that 89.1% of 
participants with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 had an antibody 
titer of >32 three weeks after infection, although a baseline 
serum sample was not taken; therefore, seroconversion 
could not be demonstrated (17). None of the participants 
with positive PCR results reported taking NIs, and all had 
serum samples taken >2 weeks after the positive nose swab 
specimen, allowing sufﬁ  cient time for seroconversion. Our 
results are likely to be true positives, as all swabs were only 
taken when patients were symptomatic. Previously, virus 
isolation has been the gold standard for inﬂ  uenza detection 
but RT-PCR is now considered to be more sensitive and 
speciﬁ  c. A previous study by some of the current authors 
has shown that seroconversion occurs in 80%–90% of 
serum samples if they are tested a sufﬁ  cient time after 
infection (conﬁ  rmed by RT-PCR) (19). Nasal swabs are a 
relatively peripheral type of sample (20). If viral load is low 
in the nose, the sample may be insufﬁ  cient as an antigenic 
stimulus to induce a detectable level of seroconversion 
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Table 3. Factors significantly associated with positive titer for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in HCWs at 4 hospitals, Australia, August 24–
December 16, 2009* 
Factor  Antibody positive, n = 46  Antibody negative, n = 185  Adjusted OR (95% CI) 
Mean age (range), y  33.0 (19.8–49.7)  35.6 (21.2–56.6)  0.92 (0.87–0.98) 
Workplace, no. HCWs 
 Emergency  department  13 56 1
  Infectious diseases ward  1 31 0.17 (0.02–1.48) 
  Intensive care unit  19 45 2.53 (1.05–6.09) 
 Medical  ward  5 16 –
 Other  6 22 –
    Respiratory ward  2 15 –
Hospital no., no HCWs 
 1  11 54 1
 2  3 48 0.26  (0.07–0.98) 
 3  15 41 –
 4  17 42 –
Community contact with influenza, no. HCWs  4 38 0.25 (0.07–0.92) 
Gloves for DP, no. using/no. responses 40/45  182/184  0.06 (0.01–0.46) 
Median no. children <18 y in household (range)  0 (0–7)  0 (0–4)  1.83 (1.18–2.82) 
*HCWs, health care workers; OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; –, no result (comparator group); DP, droplet precautions. Results are adjusted for 
HCW status (clinical vs. nonclinical), gender, receipt of seasonal influenza vaccine, confirmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009, reported respiratory illness, 
oseltamivir prophylaxis, hours worked per week, work type (doctor, nurse, physiotherapist, other), work contact with influenza virus infection, mask/eye 
protection/gown/gloves for patients in droplet precautions, aerosol-generating procedures, and wearing an N95 mask or eye protection. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Risk for Health Care Workers
in the serum. This may be the explanation for the lack of 
seroconversion seen in some PCR-positive cases in this 
study. 
Because the number of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases 
in Victoria was low by the time this study commenced, 
we used a single antibody measurement for diagnosis in 
most patients. This is not ideal, because some participants 
may have had preexisting cross-reactive antibodies, as 
reported by others (15,16). However, this cross-reactivity 
has been most commonly found in older persons >65 years 
of age, a population which was underrepresented in our 
study. The explanation given for presence of cross-reactive 
antibodies in older persons has been past exposure to 
other antigenically similar viruses or a lifetime exposure 
to inﬂ  uenza A virus (17). Because this exposure could not 
have occurred in our younger study participants (median 
age 38 years) and serum samples were collected toward the 
end of the pandemic wave when many would have already 
been exposed, reactivity likely was speciﬁ  c to pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009. These factors support the use of a single 
antibody measurement for diagnosis.
This study relied on self-reported symptoms and risk 
factors, including use of PPE, making it subject to recall 
bias. This is a particular problem potentially for recall of 
exposures (e.g., to others with inﬂ  uenza or for use of PPE). 
However, many of the predictor variables were not subject 
to recall bias (e.g., clinical or nonclinical status, work 
place, age, gender, occupation, and number of children 
in the household). In addition, in order to inﬂ  uence the 
results, the 2 exposure groups would have had to exhibit 
differential recall. Although it could be postulated that 
HCWs may have perceived that they were at greater risk for 
exposure and may have therefore been more conscientious 
when ﬁ  lling out questionnaires, we believe that because of 
the large amount of public awareness of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 at that time, it is unlikely that this group would have 
been more conscientious than the nonclinical group.
In conclusion, we found that HCWs did not have 
a substantially increased risk of contracting pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 in a health care setting with high availability 
of PPE. We conclude that use of PPE was highly protective 
against acquiring pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection, 
and we therefore encourage its use, along with scrupulous 
hand hygiene and respiratory etiquette. 
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